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introduction 
As the production of Nepal’s hydropower future continues 
to intensify, more and more Nepalis are becoming ayojanale 
prabhabit manchhe or ‘project-affected people’ within an 
imagined ‘hydropower nation’.1 This essay focuses eth-
nographic attention on changing patterns of subjectivity, 
livelihood, and agency co-arising within the overlapping 
hydroscapes2 of Nepal. Importantly, hydropower proj-
ects enter places and economies already in flux— they 
encounter, complicate, and catalyze patterns of work and 
mobility that are already in flux due to ubiquitous pat-
terns of outmigration and foreign employment (see Bruslé 
2014; Sijapati & Limbu 2012; Adhikari & Hobley 2011). Each 
hydropower project creates a rebalanced landscape of risk 
and opportunity, shaped by shifting concepts of locality, 
belonging, citizenship, and ‘affectedness’ that are constantly 
evolving in response to an entanglement of aspirations 
and future-making projects (see Arora 2014; Subba 2014; 
Shneiderman 2014). And as each project develops, oppor-
tunities and patterns for the deployment, exchange, and 
replacement of local and extra-local labor become in-
creasingly intricate. Other projects follow, the road wends 
further upstream. Some people wish to go, others wish to 
stay. Flows of labor, capital, and imagination are coming 
and going always, rushing into the watershed, churning and 
eddying for a while, then trickling or rushing away.
Building on past scholarship that has described the social 
and political contours of hydropower in Nepal (see Pan-
dey 1996; Armbrecht 1999; Gyawali 2003; Rai 2005; Dixit 
& Gyawali 2010; Rest 2012) my ongoing research project3 
This essay focuses ethnographic attention on 
changing patterns of subjectivity, livelihood, 
and agency co-arising within the production 
of Nepal’s imagined hydropower future. As 
the projects and processes of hydropower 
development proliferate across the physical 
and human geographies of Nepal they produce 
many different kinds of risk and opportunity, 
as well as labor, mobility, and ‘project-affected 
people’. Combining empirical and visual 
methods, this essay describe how these 
lived hydroscapes are shaped by shifting 
concepts of locality, belonging, citizenship, and 
‘affectedness’ that are constantly evolving in 
response to an entanglement of aspirations 
and future-making projects.
Keywords: Hydropower development, Himalayan water 
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investigates the emerging processes of social and spatial 
change that shape the lived experience of hydropower 
development in Nepal. Focusing on in-progress projects 
being built in the upper watersheds of the Trishuli and 
Tamakoshi rivers, this essay uses visual ethnographic 
methods to empirically and critically evaluate what is seen 
and not seen within the uncertain and uneven production 
of Nepal’s hydropower future—to query the making of a 
hydropower nation.
Massive efforts are being made to secure the hydropower 
future for the well-being of Nepal’s future citizens; in the 
name of economic security, energy sovereignty, political 
stability, and social justice; and in response to a discourse 
of permanent and interpenetrating crises—”to keep an 
entire generation from growing up in the dark.” 4 After de-
cades of failed planning, heated Himalayan hydropolitics, 
and persistent problems of elite capture and corruption 
(see Gyawali 2003) a new wave of political, financial, and 
environmental mobilizations promise to reorient and 
restructure Nepal’s water resources to create ‘sustainable 
development.’ And despite popular frustrations and the 
free-market rhetoric of the Kathmandu polemicists, things 
are very much in motion (see República 7 September 2014). 
Currently, there are twenty-four different hydropower 
projects in different phases of planning and construction in 
the Trishuli and Tamakoshi watersheds alone, representing 
over 2,450 MW of electricity generation capacity5—more 
than three times the current electricity supply for all of 
Nepal (Nepal Electricity Authority 2014). Yet, there is a 
recurring problem of optics, where centralized planning, 
centralizing discourse, and the needs of the center obscure 
the lived experience of the expanding hydropower frontier.
In Mailung, a small Tamang village in Rasuwa that now 
hosts three concurrent hydropower projects (one being 
built by a small Nepali independent power producer, one 
being built by a Chinese transnational, and one being 
built by a Korean engineering firm with funding from the 
International Finance Corporation), one man said, “Just five 
years ago there was only eight houses here and no road. 
Now the Koreans have said they will need 1200 workers 
here. But how many people from Rasuwa? How many peo-
ple from outside? And after the project is finished what will 
we do? People will go back to working in Malaysia. The vil-
lage will become like an empty egg.” Downstream, a Gurung 
woman expressed a different kind of concern, saying, “We 
should have gone to the [stakeholder] meeting and asked 
for work, but we didn’t. We women don’t know anything 
about these kinds of things. We have to take care of the ani-
mals. The project may come, but we are only here rotting in 
the village [laughing].” The hydropower future is coming, 
but some have better access to that future than others.
In response to these uncertainties, my research hopes to 
foreground the ways in which differently implicated ‘proj-
ect-affected people’ organize meaning within the making 
of the hydropower future—to build a more complete pic-
ture of the production and distribution of the hydropower 
future, supporting “vigilance against reduction, either to 
the inert backdrop of physical geography or to the ideal-
ism of mental maps” (Chari & Gidwani 2005: 270).
hydropolitics, Territory, and imagination
The transition toward an imagined socioeconomic future 
and a re-imagined state proceeds via an interpenetrating 
array of material and discursive interventions that impli-
cate a broad variety of human and physical geographies 
and that require multiple overlapping ‘scale-making proj-
ects’ (cf. Tsing 2000). As a result of its unique physical and 
political geography, Nepal is located at the turbulent cen-
ter of both the ‘water towers of Asia’ discourse and the re-
surgent global interest in large-scale hydropower projects 
in the current era of climate-energy geopolitics and carbon 
markets (see Bandyopadhyay 2013; Nusser 2014; Erlewein 
2014). Meanwhile, the official statistics describing Nepal’s 
national power crisis are well known—due to population 
growth, urbanization, and changing consumption patterns 
Nepal’s demand for electricity has doubled since 2004; only 
43% of the population has access to electricity; despite de-
cades of planning and development conflicts Nepal has re-
alized only 705 MW of installed generation capacity; peak 
demand is expected to exceed 2,000 MW by 2020 (Nepal 
Electricity Authority 2014). During the dry winter months, 
the unfulfilled promise of 83,000 MW6 of power generation 
capacity hangs like a cloud over Kathmandu, as worsening 
blackouts consume the rapidly growing city of over three 
million people for up to sixteen hours per day.7 Hydropow-
er development is undeniably needed in Nepal, but what 
kinds of hydropower development and for whom?
As the citizens of an aspiring hydropower nation, Nepalis 
are represented within multiple frames of subjectivity—as 
electricity users who collectively shape aggregate de-
mand; as political citizens who will shape Nepal’s nascent 
democracy; as economic consumers whose needs, desires, 
and ambitions shape economic growth; as financialized 
stakeholders with territorial claims to the benefits of 
hydropower development; as different kinds of ‘project-af-
fected people’ who must bear the costs of future-making. 
In these ways, Nepal’s hydropower futures are “structured 
through contested notions of progress, emancipation, 
and betterment” (Swyngedouw 1999: 449) that empower 
certain logics, claims, actors and processes to define gover-
nance and citizenship within shifting imaginative terrain. 
Hydropower development has long been a key technology 
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Figure 1. Construction of the powerhouse tunnel at the Upper Tamakoshi hydropower Project (456 mW). Gonggar, Dolakha.
(Austin Lord, 2013)
Figure 2. a man and security forces watching a local boycott of the public hearing for the Trishuli 3B hydropower Project (37 mW). Shanti Bajaar, Nuwakot. 
(Austin Lord,  2013)
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Figure 3. local bus going through the dam site of the Trishuli 3a Project (60 mW). mailung, Rasuwa. 
(Austin Lord, 2013) 
Figure 4. Construction of a basin to collect silt at the intake of the Upper Tamakoshi hydropower Project (456 mW). lamabagar, Dolakha. 
(Austin Lord, 2013)
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of government and state-making (Mitchell 2002; Bakker 
1999; Worster 1985).8 In contemporary Nepal, the promise 
of the hydropower future ensures the economic and politi-
cal coherence of the state and vice versa—the hydropower 
nation and the citizens required for that project are being 
co-produced.
Spatially, hydropower development uses a particular set 
of calculative logics to arrange and classify Nepal into a 
fractal network of licensed project sites,9 ‘project-affect-
ed areas’, ‘national priority projects,’ and ‘power cor-
ridors’—creating new kinds of territories. Socially, this 
process requires synchronized practices of delineation 
and classification, stakeholder engagement, compensation 
and mitigation, and rules that seek to distribute the costs 
and benefits of making the hydropower future—creating 
new kinds of subjectivity and agency. The production of 
hydrologic vision and value is supported by transnational 
flows of capital, economic partnerships, and development 
policies that are increasingly co-constitutive and that 
affect political rationality at all scales.10
Following a period of intense political volatility and the 
national elections of November 2013 (see Thapa & Sijapati 
2004; Lecomte-Tilouine 2013; Gellner 2014) the Nepalese 
state is reforming with the hydropower future in mind 
and hoping to realize a developmental ‘peace dividend’11 
by ensuring policy stability (Investment Board of Nepal 
2012). In recent years, several unique political initiatives 
have been undertaken to underwrite, prioritize, subsidize, 
or guarantee the hydropower future—responding to ‘crisis’ 
by creating Emergency Action Plans and financialized 
spaces of exception (cf. Ong 2006). Thus special conditions, 
extra-ordinary policies, and specific exemptions are made 
that synchronize with global developmentalist initiatives 
and neoliberal forms of environmental governance (see 
Goldman 2001). In no uncertain terms, Nepal’s political 
hydro-imaginaries12 seek to attract transnational investment 
and rapidly capitalize ‘the water towers of Asia’, to market 
Nepal as the Himalayan hydropower frontier. Thus, as 
Radhesh Pant, the CEO of the recently created Investment 
Board of Nepal, has frequently and unequivocally stated: 
“Nepal is open for business.” 
But how do these imagined hydroscapes become real? How 
do the flows and interventions that support hydropower 
development interact with watersheds, local livelihoods, 
and other future-making projects?
These photographs provide an aperture onto the expand-
ing hydropower frontier, where men and machines are 
boring tunnels into the Himalaya and raising massive 
structures to divert the flow of Nepal’s rivers. They depict 
Nepalis working in the hydroscape, enlisted in a globalized 
industry of hydraulic expertise and knowledge production 
(Mitchell 2002; see also Klingensmith 2007) and ‘cascades 
of inscription’ (cf. Latour 1987) which turn flowing water 
into hydrologic data, cash flow statements, political will, 
and truckloads of concrete. These photographs also cap-
ture contemporary shifts in local economies and liveli-
hoods, political rationalities, patterns of circulation and 
mobility, and socio-environmental practices of place-mak-
ing—the impacts and effects of which are not yet fully 
understood. These photographs show the making of an 
uncertain hydropower nation in real-time, which does not 
follow the master plans of timeline and maps, but emerges 
recursively and iteratively through a muddier praxis.
hydropower and manpower
Importantly, these photographs also show Nepalis who 
are simultaneously engaged in their own transformative 
projects and globalist efforts, located within their 
own frames of meaning and projects of future-making 
(Shneiderman 2014). Central among these efforts are 
ubiquitous and intensive trends of outmigration and 
foreign employment—over three million Nepalis working 
abroad supporting a remittance economy that represents 
over 25% of GDP in aggregate, NRs 543.29 billion in the 
2013/2014 fiscal year alone (República 7 Sept 2014).13 
As hydropower proliferates across Nepal it encounters 
everywhere communities and families with people abroad, 
households emptied in response to lack of economic 
opportunities, unemployment, marginalization, and socio-
environmental change (Bruslé 2014; Sijapati & Limbu 2012; 
Adhikari & Hobley 2011).
Though labor migration is often talked about as a mono-
lithic or statistical phenomenon (too often simplified by 
those who praise its potentiality for liberation or deride 
its very real inequities) it is in fact an extremely heteroge-
neous assemblage of different kinds of migration (Ra-
ghuram 2009) representing divergent trajectories (Bruslé 
2009) and a range of divergent outcomes (Wagle 2012). 
On one hand, many Nepalis working abroad face systemic 
exploitation and significant risks; while on the other labor 
migration has increased economic well-being and agency 
for some. Migration can break or reinforce patterns of 
social exclusion. There is no ‘push or pull’ model that can 
explain the reasons people come and go (Gardner & Osella 
2003) and people identify with a variety of different kinds 
of coming and going (Shneiderman 2014). Migration is a 
double-edged sword: a product of socioeconomic inequity 
and structural violence, and an alternative to hierarchy 
and centralized modernities that demonstrates the perfo-
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rated quality of hegemony (Gidwani & Sivaramakrishnan 
2003). Yet it is undeniably true that some have better 
access to beneficial migration opportunities than others.
During my fieldwork within current ‘project-affected 
areas,’ people commonly responded to questions about 
livelihood and labor migration by saying “harek gharbata ek 
jana bidesh janchha” (one person from each household goes 
abroad). While this may not always be statistically correct, 
this expression is telling of patterns of absence, co-loca-
tion, and changing identities that accommodate increas-
ingly discontinuous livelihood strategies (see Shneiderman 
2014). It is also telling of the everyday concerns of the 
hydropower nation.
Thus as hydropower proliferates upriver across the 
country, I found that Nepalis are facing common choices: 
between working for a hydropower project or migrat-
ing, referred to as bahira jane (going outside). In Dolakha 
district, one Sherpa man who was frustrated that his sons 
returned to the Gulf after failing to find project work com-
plained: “We have a good project here in our village, but 
we are weak [politically]. So it is still very difficult to get 
work and we are all still paying 1-2 lakh to go to Dubai.” 
Some projects offer better wages or better work than 
others. Some people have better access to jobs and other 
project benefits than others. 
Firstly, because hydropower development is capital inten-
sive and not labor intensive, it often acts as an extractive 
industry and (unfortunately) does not directly support 
local livelihoods in the long term (Pandey 1996). Secondly, 
the limited resources that do flow to the affected commu-
nities are typically absorbed or diverted by those in a posi-
tion to do so. Systematic corruption is common and people 
everywhere say paisa khayo or ‘money was eaten’. Thirdly, 
hydropower enters an extremely hierarchical landscape, 
stratified in part by uneven cycles of migration and debt, 
that constrains the efficacy of standardized programs for 
benefit-sharing. Again, some have better access to the 
hydropower future than others. 
Meanwhile, in the political realm, the scale and intensity of 
current patterns of labor migration are frequently invoked 
to support the political necessity of the hydropower fu-
ture. Polemics in the newspaper routinely present hydro-
power as a panacea for scarcity and underdevelopment, as 
a means to stem the massive outflow of migrants and intel-
lectual capital or the pattern of ‘young people dying in the 
desert’.14 A recent editorial by Kunda Dixit, editor-in-chief 
of the Nepali Times, states flatly: “Of the many examples 
of governance failure we see around us, perhaps the most 
striking is the way we have mismanaged our two most 
important resources: manpower and hydropower” (Dixit 
2013: 1). Migration is thus a sociopolitical issue and a finan-
cial force equal to hydropower; an outpouring of needs and 
ambition that parallels, catalyzes, and may ultimately re-
inforce the production of the hydropower future. In short, 
my research seeks to understand how hydro-imaginaries 
and migrant imaginaries interrelate, both within material 
realities of project-affected watersheds and the discursive 
arena of Nepal’s political-economies.
Rights and affectedness
Crucially, as the pace of hydropower development and the 
scale of labor migration continue to rise in parallel, beliefs 
about development, place, and economic empowerment 
are changing as people make efforts toward “becoming an 
agent of bikas (development) rather than one of its targets” 
(Pigg 1992: 511). Consequently, negotiations between 
local and extra-local actors concerning rights are grow-
ing increasingly complex, as new territorial claims and 
subjectivities bring new opportunities for agency. Due to 
a long history of government malfeasance and foreign aid 
people often directly equate hydropower development and 
its infrastructure as a means for ‘becoming bikasit (devel-
oped)’ (Rest 2012; Pigg 1992). Local people desire to be 
represented, to be consulted, to be heard—and the formal-
ized process of hydropower development can sometimes 
offer that kind of participation (though extremely uneven-
ly, imperfectly, and inconsistently). In fact, in the majority 
of communities I have conducted interviews hydropower 
development and ‘affectedness’ is widely understood as an 
opportunity for rights, despite concerns over displacement 
and dislocation. 
Thus, at a public hearing for one contentious project, a 
woman representing the UCPN-Maoist party said: “This 
project needs to take place. We are not for boycotting this 
project. But all our demands should be heard. Not just with 
words but a written commitment. Once the locals have a 
sense of ownership you will not have to worry about the 
project.” Another man leading a local bahiskar or boycott of 
that same project hearing told me: “When we had the last 
public hearing, we weren’t much aware of these things… 
they promised facilities and one job for each household and 
many things, but nothing was written. We made this boy-
cott to remind them of their promises. We are seeing this 
happen again, and this is an opportunity for rights.” As this 
new politics of recognition develops, social mitigation pro-
grams and stakeholder engagement programs are slowly 
adapting and improving (Dixit & Gyawali 2010). And people 
are adapting so as to be included in the hydropower future.
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As other critical studies have found, as development 
projects enter and create new territories “new forms of 
transnational connection are increasingly enabling ‘local’ 
actors to challenge the state’s well-established claims to 
encompassment and vertical superiority in unexpected 
ways” (Ferguson & Gupta 2002: 988). This precipitates com-
plex processes of bargaining, acts of ‘counter-conduct’15 
(cf. Foucault 2007), and a variety of strategic positionalities 
(Shneiderman 2010, Scott 2009). Hydropower development 
and labor migration mutually engage with longstanding 
spatial hierarchies and center-periphery relationships—
they are both extractive and promising. New structures of 
capitalization and government are co-evolving alongside 
new mobilities and patterns of exchange are co-evolving as 
“people move in and out spaces of bikas” (Pigg 1992: 510).
In this way, relationships of participation and resistance 
are constantly shifting, selectively within and between 
multi-scalar regimes of governance along Nepal’s 
hydropower frontier as intersecting subjectivities are 
defined, proposed, imposed, desired, contested, ignored, 
traded, and elaborated. This means that in the Upper 
Tamakoshi watershed, it is easier for ‘project-affected’ 
Nepalis to claim rights from the Chinese transnational 
SinoHydro (the largest global actor in hydropower 
development, operating in more than seventy-four 
countries) than it is to approach their own government. 
This means that at each project site a large percentage 
of the local population and workforce is working abroad 
in Abu Dhabi, Qatar, or Malaysia; complicating simplistic 
definitions of locality and extending each ‘project-affected 
area’ well beyond the borders of Nepal. This means that 
in the district of Rasuwa, there are more ‘project-affected 
persons’ who purchased shares in the initial public 
offering of stock in the Chilime Hydropower Company 
Ltd. than people who voted in the national elections of 
November 2013.16 These are the citizens of the emerging 
hydropower nation.
Seeing the Future
The hydropower future exists, therefore, not as a mono-
lithic discursive object, but as a disunified discursive 
framework of ‘improvement’ that proliferates relationally 
by speaking to a variety of audiences and agendas (see Li 
2007; Mitchell 2002; Roseberry 1994). The material and 
social interventions of hydropower development are being 
woven into a larger aspirational project, where millions 
of Nepalis are differently seeking well-being and ways of 
‘becoming bikasit’ (Pigg 1992) within alternative futures 
and imaginaries. Hydropower development is just one 
manifestation of a ‘will to improve’ (cf. Li 2007) that runs 
through seemingly distant and disparate lives, connecting 
the composite citizens of a hydropower nation within a 
plurality of hydro-imaginaries that are differently formed 
and variably contested. Thus it is important to understand 
how the promise of the hydro-future moves upstream, 
how it is received and challenged, how it entangles with 
other projects of future making, how it succeeds or fails as 
it changes and fragments into new pragmatic forms, how 
it is lived. 
In this essay, I have attempted to present a balanced, 
informed, and grounded analysis of the making of a 
hydropower nation. And the visual ethnography that 
complements this text highlights the work involved in 
this polyvalent effort, documenting local conditions of 
labor and mobility at a variety of project sites. Just outside 
the frame are millions of Nepalis who are elsewhere, 
connected to ‘project-affected areas’ and the concerns of 
the hydropower future in their own diverse ways, doing 
their best during a time of considerable social transition 
and uncertainty. Hydropower development and labor 
migration are interrelated in a variety of ways and at 
overlapping scales—connected by common urgencies 
and wicked problems of social justice, interwoven across 
landscapes of social imagination. Each hydropower 
project affects divergent patterns of empowerment and 
disempowerment, connectedness and fragmentation—yet 
the making of the hydropower future is itself a site of 
confluence. 
The broader collection of photographs that accompanies this 
essay is featured on our website: <www.himalayajournal.org/
photo-essay/>. 
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Endnotes
1. A central theme and commonly repeated phrase 
from “Power Summit 2013: Hastening the Pace of 
Hydropower Development”: a national conference that 
convened representatives from the hydropower industry, 
development experts, government officials, ambassadors, 
and foreign investors. Crowne Plaza Kathmandu-Soaltee, 
August 26-27, 2013.
2. Erik Swyngedouw (1999) famously coined the term 
‘waterscape’ to discuss the landscape of possibility 
produced by a group of ‘socionatural interventions’ 
focused on water (Swyngedouw 1999). In Nepal, however, 
the majority of waterscapes are oriented specifically 
around hydropower potential—as Dipak Gyawali (2003) has 
said, the Nepalese state sees only ‘falling water’. Nusser 
(2014) has also recently used the term ‘technological 
hydroscape’ to discuss the development of large dams 
across the Himalayan region.
3. Between September 2012 and the time of writing, I 
have conducted nine months of ethnographic fieldwork in 
Nepal. At the time of publication I am in Nepal continuing 
this work as a 2014-2015 Fulbright Research Scholar.
4. A popular phrasing, echoed in Nepali newspapers and 
repeated several times at Power Summit 2013.
5. The Trishuli River hosts 14 hydropower projects 
representing 838 MW of power generation capacity; while 
the Tamakoshi River hosts 10 projects representing 1,617 
MW of power generation capacity, including the 456 MW 
Upper Tamakoshi Hydropower Project (the largest project 
currently being built in Nepal).
6. In 1966, Nepal’s Dr. Hari Man Shrestha formally 
estimated that Nepali rivers could theoretically generate 
about 83,000 MW of electricity based on 88 billion cubic 
meters of storage potential, of which 43,000 MW was 
considered economically viable (Gyawali 2003). Due to 
technological developments and updated calculations, 
both of these figures are now generally considered to be an 
underestimate.
7. Referred to as ‘load shedding’ these blackouts are the 
result of systematized power allocations that change 
over the course of the year relative to demand and the 
seasonally available flows for existing hydropower plants, 
which provide roughly 90% of Nepal’s current power 
supply.
8. Karen Bakker has argued in her analysis of the political 
economy of hydropower on the Mekong River that “dams 
serve as important nodes of control in the interrelated 
processes of the changing territoriality of the state, the 
commodification of water, and the increasing penetration 
of the interests of a largely urban elite into rural areas” 
(Bakker 1999: 229).
9. As of September 2013, the Ministry of Energy claimed 
that 70 of 337 permitted hydropower projects representing 
were under construction or at ‘advanced stages of 
planning.’ Power Summit 2013.
10. See Braun 2000 for a parallel discussion of the ways 
in which ‘geologic vision’ changed 19th century British 
Columbia: “As a set of rules governing what was visible 
in nature, geology brought a ‘territory’ with its ‘qualities’ 
into being, and thus opened a space—simultaneously 
epistemological and geographical—that could be 
incorporated into forms of political rationality” (Braun 
2000: 28).
11. Bakker (1999) and Hirsch (2000) both reference a 
similar ‘peace dividend’ when discussing government 
ambitions to create the political and policy stability 
needed for hydropower development in the Mekong river 
basin region.
12. “Social imaginaries can be understood as implicit 
‘backgrounds’ that make possible communal practices and 
a widely shared sense of their legitimacy” (Steger 2009: 
12). See also Taylor (2002) or Appadurai (1996) on the 
production of new social imaginaries.
austin lord (Master of Environmental Science, Yale 
University, 2014) is an anthropologist studying the interface 
of environment and economy. His ongoing research concerns 
processes of social and spatial change in areas affected by 
hydropower development in Nepal, with a particular focus 
on changing livelihoods and shifting patterns of migration 
and mobility. Austin has conducted nine months of fieldwork 
in Nepal, and is currently continuing this work with the 
support of a Fulbright grant. In the past, Austin also studied 
Hydrology at Portland State University and Economics at 
Dartmouth College. A broader collection of his photographic 
work can be found at www.austinlord.com.
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13. The Asian Development Bank recently reported that 
Nepali migrants sent home NRs 543.3 billion in remittances 
(~$540 USD) during the 2013-2014 fiscal year, representing 
an astounding 33.1% increase from the NRs 408.1 billion of 
2012-2013 (Republica 2014). Despite these massive numbers, 
many critics still claim that such institutionally reported 
figures routinely underestimate the real total of informal 
remittance, which may be significantly higher. 
14. This discourse references several ongoing 
controversies concerning unjust working conditions, 
human rights abuses, and thousands of mortalities among 
Nepali migrants working in the Gulf States. Several 
accounts of these trends have emerged in national and 
global media, the most well-known being Pete Pattison’s 
exposé of ‘World Cup Slaves’ working in Qatar, published 
in September 2013.
15. Counter-conduct can be defined as “the will not to 
be governed thusly, like that, by these people, at this 
price” (Foucault 2007: 75). See also Death (2010) on the 
differentiation between counter-conducts and protest. 
16. For comparison: 31,123 people from Rasuwa district 
purchased shares in the Chilime offering on the Nepal 
stock exchange in 2010 (Chilime Hydropower Company 
Ltd. Annual Report 2013). 23,675 people voted in the 
district of Rasuwa during the Constituent Assembly 
elections of 2013 (Election Commission of Nepal 2014).
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